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Essay
The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an
Independent Right Protecting the




Why did the defendants ask Midler to sing if her voice was not
of value to them? Why did they studiously acquire the services of a
sound-alike and instruct her to imitate Midler if Midler's voice was
not of value to them? What they sought was an attribute of Mid-
ler's identity. Its value was what the market would have paid for
Midler to have sung the commercial in person.'
After forty years of wandering in a definitional wilderness, the right of
publicity appears to have reached the promised land of independent
status, a distinct right and remedy unmoored from privacy or any
other analogic anchor. This Essay2 explores that process of recogni-
tion and the current state of the right of publicity.
* Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law. B.A. Cornell Uni-
versity, 1957; L.L.B. Cornell University, 1959. Earlier versions of this Essay were
presented at the American Bar Association 1994 Annual Meeting (Section on Torts and
Insurance Practice) and at a colloquium at the University of Cincinnati College of Law. I
am grateful to the participants for their comments and suggestions.
1. Midler v. Ford Motor Company, 849 F.2d 460,463 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1513 (1992).
2. Some portions of this discussion have been derived from SHELDON W. HALPERN,
THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY, AND MoRAL RIGHT, Part Three-Pub-
licity: The Interest in the Associative Value of Personality (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter Hal-
pern, PRIVACY, PUBLICrIy] and from Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity:
Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. Rnv. 1199
(1986) [hereinafter Halpern, Associative Value].
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Dispute and confusion 3 marked the emergence and development
of the so-called "right of publicity,"'4 a right concerned with the use of
attributes5 of a generally identifiable person to enhance the commer-
cial value of an enterprise. For present purposes, the right of publicity
is considered peculiarly celebrity based, arising only in the case of an
individual who has attained some degree of notoriety or fame.6
Although commentators disagree over whether "celebrity" is a neces-
sary element of the cause of action or relates only to the extent of
damages sustained, in practice that debate is largely academic. 7
Whatever other controversy may exist, there is general agree-
ment about the genesis of this "haystack in a hurricane." 8 The right of
publicity as currently understood was the product of the determina-
tion of the Second Circuit in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chew-
ing Gum, Inc.9 that a celebrity has a right to damages and other relief
for the unauthorized commercial appropriation of the celebrity's per-
3. "There is obvious difficulty in defining a 'right of privacy' for public personages."
Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See David E. Shipley, Pub-
licity Never Dies; It Just Fades Away: The Right of Publicity and Federal Preemption, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 673, 675 (1981) ("[T]he definition of the right of publicity remains un-
clear; its theory is still evolving and its limits are uncertain.").
4. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit apparently invented the phrase in
1953 in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953), in an effort to distinguish the right of exclusive
control over the commercial exploitation of personality from the "right of privacy." The
"right of publicity" is not the most felicitous of phrases and, in the light of history, appears
to miss the nature of the protected interest. However, because it has come to be a readily
accepted shorthand for the complex personality interest in economic exploitation, I will
continue the conventional usage.
5. See infra text and accompanying notes 28-45 for discussion of the requisite
"attributes."
6. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heri-
tage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 702 (Ga. 1982).
7. An individual who is not well known will not have generated appreciable "as-
sociative value." See infra text accompanying notes 17-23. See also Tim Frazer, Appropria-
tion of Personality-A New Tort?, 99 LAW Q. REv. 281, 308 (1983); Richard B. Hoffman,
The Right of Publicity-Heirs' Right, Advertisers' Windfall, or Courts' Nightmare?, 31
DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 5 (1981); Andrew B. Sims, Right of Publicity: Survivability Reconsid-
ered, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 473 (1981). But cf. Harold R. Gordon, Right of Property in
Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 553, 554-55 (1960); Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 191, 202-03 (1983) (advocating recognition of a "universal" right of publicity);
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROnS. 203,204 (1954);
Harriet F. Pilpel, The Right of Publicity, 27 BULL. CoPYiGorr Soc'y 249, 255-56 (1980);
Shipley, supra note 3, at 723 & 724 n.325 (1981).
8. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 418, 485 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956).
9. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
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sona and that such a right is independent of a common-law or a statu-
tory right of privacy.
The historical development of the right of publicity, and its rela-
tion to the right of privacy, has been fully described elsewhere.10
Although the right of publicity, as such, was born in 1953 with the
Haelan decision, it has antecedents in doctrines relating to deception,
fraud, and unfair competition11 and strong links to the right of privacy.
However, Haelan was the start of a judicial and legislative movement
delineating an economic right in one's persona distinct from the right
of privacy or any of the other cognates and analogues' 2 in tort. The
association of the distinctly economic interest in personality with the
privacy interest in solitude, the right to be free from public exposure,
has been the source of much confusion.13 The process by which the
right of publicity had come to be linked to the right of privacy is more
fortuitous14 than inevitable, more paradoxical than logical. Cutting
through the paradox, Judge Frank, in Haelan, opined that New York
law recognized an independent, common-law right protecting eco-
nomic interests rather than the personal, emotional interests contem-
plated by the right of privacy:
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of pri-
vacy (which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right in
the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the ex-
clusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may
validly be made 'in gross' ....
10. See, e.g., Halpern, Associative Value, supra note 2, at 1203-15; Michael Madow,
Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv.
125, 147-78 (1993). For a comprehensive examination of the right of publicity, its relation
to the other interests, and a detailed examination of the state and federal, common-law and
statutory treatment of the subject, see generally J. THOmAS McCARY, THE RIGHTS OF
PuBLICITy AND PRWVACY (1992).
11. See, e.g., Chaplin v. Amador, 269 P. 544 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928); Sullivan v. Ed Sulli-
van Radio & T.V., Inc., 152 N.Y.S.2d 227 (App. Div. 1956).
12. For a thorough discussion of the analogic inflation, see Richard Ausness, The
Right of Publicity: A "Haystack in a Hurricane," 55 TEMP. L.Q. 977 (1982).
13. Id. at 981-83; Frazer, supra note 7, at 295-300; Thomas Huff, Thinking Clearly
About Privacy, 55 WAsH. L. RFv. 777, 784 (1980); Shipley, supra note 3, at 681-82; Sims,
supra note 7, at 464-65.
14. Indeed, much of the linkage and attendant confusion stems from the attempt by
Dean Prosser to rationalize a four-legged privacy model, a tort encompassing four distinct
variants of personality invasion, one of which is the "[a]ppropriation, for the defendant's
advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness." William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L.
REv. 383, 389 (1960). The Prosser quadruped was embodied in the Second Restatement of
Torts, of which Dean Prosser was the Reporter. RESATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 652A (1977). With the newly approved Third Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competi-
tion, the American Law Institute has finally acknowledged the judicial release of the right
of publicity from these earlier constrictions. See infra text accompanying note 27.
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This right might be called a 'right of publicity.' For it is com-
mon knowledge that many prominent persons.. . , far from having
their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses,
would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for au-
thorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, dis-
played in newspapers, magazines, busses [sic], trains and subways.
This right of publicity would usually yield them no money unless it
could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any
other advertiser from using their pictures.
We think the New York decisions recognize such a right.15
With this succinct analysis, unencumbered by glosses on the right
of privacy, Judge Frank enunciated a right flowing from the economic
value of celebrity. He recognized an interest, distinct from privacy,
that deserved distinct protection, even though the operative act invad-
ing that interest-publication for commercial purposes-is the same
act that might invade the interest protected by the right of privacy.
With only the ironic counterpoint of the New York Court of Ap-
peals-which held, in 1984, that New York's right of privacy statute
precluded recognition of a common-law right of publicity16-the years
since Haelan have witnessed a process of maturation in the develop-
ment of a flexible common-law approach to the commercialization of
identity and the "associative value" inherent in celebrity.
The Nature of the Right: Associative Value
Today, it is commonplace for individuals to promote or adver-
tise commercial services and products or... even have their identi-
ties infused in the products. Individuals prominent in athletics,
business, entertainment and the arts.., are frequently involved in
such enterprises. When a product's promoter determines that the
commercial use of a particular person will be advantageous, the pro-
moter is often willing to pay handsomely for the privilege. As a
result, the sale of one's persona in connection with the promotion of
commercial products has unquestionably become big business.
Such commercial use of an individual's identity is intended to
increase the value or sales of the product by fusing the celebrity's
identity with the product and thereby siphoning some of the public-
ity value or good will in the celebrity's persona into the product.
15. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). Judge Frank's prediction as to what the New York
courts would do, however, was not to be fulfilled, as the New York Court of Appeals took
a contrary position some 30 years later in Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474
N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984).
16. "Since the 'right of publicity' is encompassed under the Civil Rights Law as an
aspect of the right of privacy, which ... is exclusively statutory . . ., the plaintiff cannot
claim an independent common-law right of publicity." Stephano, 474 N.E.2d at 183.
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[T]he marketable product ... is the ability of a person's name
or likeness to attract the attention and evoke a desired response in a
particular consumer audience. That response is a kind of good will
or recognition value generated by that person.... While this prod-
uct is concededly intangible, it is not illusory.17
The phenomenon of celebrity generates commercial value. A celeb-
rity's persona confers an associative value18-an economic impact-
upon the marketability of a product. As the Third Circuit recently
observed, "[a] famous individual's name, likeness, and endorsement
carry value and an unauthorized use harms the person both by dilut-
ing the value of the name and depriving that individual of compensa-
tion."19 Whatever the social merit of commercialization of
personality20 or the morality of commercializing one's identity,21 the
economic reality persists.
Television and other media create marketable celebrity identity
value. Considerable energy and ingenuity are expended by those who
have achieved celebrity value to exploit it for profit. The law protects
the celebrity's sole right to exploit this value whether the celebrity has
17. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 437-38 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted).
18. "At its heart, the value of the right of publicity is associational." McFarland v.
Miller, 14 F.3d 912,919 (3d Cir. 1994). Cf Tennessee ex reL Presley Int'l Memorial Found.
v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987):
It would be difficult for any court today, especially one sitting in Music City
U.S.A. practically in the shadow of the Grand Ole Opry, to be unaware of the
manner in which celebrities exploit the public's recognition of their name and
image. The stores selling Elvis Presley tee shirts, Hank Williams, Jr. bandannas
or Barbara Mandrell satin jackets are not selling clothing as much as they are
selling the celebrities themselves. We are asked to buy the shortening that makes
Loretta Lynn's pie crust flakier or to buy the same insurance that Tennessee Ernie
Ford has or to eat the sausage that Jimmy Dean makes. There are few every day
activities that have not been touched by celebrity merchandising.... These en-
dorsements are of great economic value to celebrities and are now economic
reality.
Id. at 94. See Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432,437 (5th Cir. 1994) ("The misappropri-
ation tort does not protect one's name per se; rather, it protects the value associated with
that name.").
19. McFarland, 14 F.3d at 919. See Ali v. Playgirl, 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978):
The distinctive aspect of the common law right of publicity is that it recognizes
the commercial value of the ... representation of a prominent person or per-
former, and protects his proprietary interest in the profitability of his public. :.
"persona." ... This common law publicity right is analogous to a commercial
entity's right to profit from the "goodwill" it has built up in its name ....
Id. at 728.
20. Cf David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & Com'rm. PRons.
147, 163 (1981) ("Fame is not inconsistent with merit but neither is it evidence of merit.").
21. See generally Madow, supra note 10.
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achieved her fame out of rare ability, dumb luck, or a combination
thereof.22 It is the marketplace that creates and rewards such associa-
tive economic value. Whether the market is on sound moral or eco-
nomic ground in so doing is essentially irrelevant; whether such
protection in fact fosters individual creativity is similarly beside the
point. Arguably, the phenomenon may be predicated on the necessary
economics of scarcity as an inducement to creativity,23 but whatever
the conceptual underpinnings, the reality of associative value is ines-
capable. Thus, when the courts deal with the right of publicity, they
do not create the value; rather, as a matter of policy, the courts deter-
mine the extent to which one must compensate the person who has
generated the economic value for use of the persona and the limits of
the celebrity's control over the exploitation of his or her personality.
From the inception of recognition of the right, such debate as ex-
isted concerned these matters of policy; i.e., the issue had been, with
few exceptions, not whether this interest in the associative value of
identity should be recognized, but what its boundaries should be.
Thus, for example, courts and commentators disagreed over whether
the right should be alienable and descendible-a variation on the
theme of the relationship between the "personal" right of privacy and
the "property" based right of publicity-a dispute resolved, by courts
22. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
23. See, e.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1994):
Without the artificial scarcity created by the protection of one's likeness, that
likeness would be exploited commercially until the marginal value of its use is
zero.
For instance, if a well-known public figure's picture could be used freely to
endorse commercial products, the value of his likeness would disappear. Creating
artificial scarcity preserves the value to him, to advertisers who contract for the
use of his likeness, and in the end, to consumers, who receive information from
the knowledge that he is being paid to endorse the product....
As Judge Posner writes:
It might seem that creating a property right in such uses would not lead to
any socially worthwhile investment but would simply enrich already wealthy ce-
lebrities. However, whatever information value a celebrity's endorsement has to
consumers will be lost if every advertiser can use the celebrity's name and picture
.... [T]he value of associating the celebrity's name with a particular product will
be diminished if others are permitted to use the name in association with their
products.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.3, at 43 (4th ed.
1992).... If exploitation of this beneficial information were not limited, its value
soon would be dissipated.
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or legislatures, largely in favor of alienability and descendibility. 24 As
a corollary, again, to the problem of privacy linkage, there arose the
question of whether the protected "identity" is limited to the privacy
formula of "name or likeness" or if it is to be viewed more broadly as
any unique identifier. 2s However, disagreement over the extent of
policy limitations on the right took place within a context of "a solid,
indeed an overwhelming, consensus within the American legal com-
munity that the right of publicity is a good thing. '26
This consensus has now been recognized by the American Law
Institute. Section 46 of the new Third Restatement of the Law of Un-
fair Competition expressly acknowledges the independent right of
publicity:
Appropriation of the Commercial Value of a Person's Identity: The
Right of Publicity. One who appropriates the commercial value of a
person's identity by using without consent the person's name, like-
ness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to
liability for [monetary and injunctive] relief.27
Here the right has fully emerged, free of its analogic ancestors, free of
the constraints of a privacy pigeonhole in the Restatement of Torts.
With a base in the law of unfair competition, the commercial, eco-
nomic, appropriation characteristics of the interest to which the right
of publicity relates are fully recognized.
The Boundaries of the Right
(1) Attributes of Identity: Beyond "Name or Likeness"
Certainly the great bulk of cases in which the "identity" of a ce-
lebrity has been appropriated involve the commercial use of some-
one's name or likeness. Whether the taking is the blatant act of selling
an Elvis Presley tee shirt,28 or a plastic bust of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr.,29 or naming a restaurant after an actor 3o or a theater after a
24. See Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, The Ddcendibility of the Right of Pub-
licity: Is There a Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L. 1125 (1980); Halpern, As-
sociative Value, supra note 2, at 1215-37.
25. HALPERN, PRIVACY, PtBLicrry, supra note 2, at 494-514.
26. Madow, supra note 10, at 134. "Most courts accept the existence of the right and
concern themselves with polishing its contours as they apply it to a diversity of factual
settings." Id. (quoting J. THOMAS McCARTHY, THE RirHTS OF PUBLICrrY AND PRIVACY,
§1.10[C] (1992)).
27. RESTATmMEN (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
28. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 908 (1979).
29. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods.,
Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
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playwright, 31 it is the name or likeness of the individual that serves to
associate that person with the taker's product. For purposes of the
right of privacy-that personal, subjective right, the invasion of which
by public exposure is more akin to an assault than to an appropriation
of valuable property32-protection is limited to an individual's "name
or likeness. ' 33 The judicial task, in elaborating the right of privacy,
became that of refining the definition.34 But, of course, for certain
people, there may be other indicia of the unique persona; certain
traits, characteristics, mannerisms, or even paraphernalia may be pe-
culiarly attached to the individual so as uniquely to evoke that
individual.
Consideration of the interest underlying the right of publicity-
the economic interest in the associative value of one's identity-
should lead to the conclusion that the interest is not invaded only by
appropriation of certain indicia of identity. If indeed one appropriates
for commercial purposes the identity of another, the means used for
that appropriation would seem irrelevant. The pertinent question
would be whether there is an unequivocal evocation by the means
chosen by the appropriator and not whether those means fit into a
predefined label. As the Sixth Circuit observed in 1983:
[T]he right of privacy and the right of publicity protect fundamen-
tally different interests and must be analyzed separately.... [A]
celebrity has a protected pecuniary interest in the commercial ex-
ploitation of his identity. If the celebrity's identity is commercially
exploited, there has been an invasion of his right whether or not his
"name or likeness" is used. 35
30. McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1994).
31. Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 483 N.Y.S.2d 218 (App. Div. 1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 489 N.E.2d 744 (N.Y. 1985).
32. See HALPERN, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY, supra note 2, at 389.
33. Id. at 392-407. The statutory formula in New York, and several other states,
"name, portrait, or picture" (N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAw § 50 (McKinney 1992)), is not essen-
tially different from the common-law "name or likeness" requirement.
34. See, e.g., Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962); Cohen v. Herbal
Concepts, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 307 (N.Y. 1984); Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472
N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1984), affd, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (App. Div. 1985). Thus, in Midler v.
Ford Motor Company, 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513
(1992), the court refused to extend to the use of a "sound-alike" California's privacy stat-
ute, which prohibited use of an individual's "name, voice, signature, photograph or like-
ness." ("The term 'likeness' refers to a visual image not a vocal imitation."). See also
Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). See infra notes
35-40 and accompanying text for discussion of the Midler and Carson right of publicity
claims.
35. Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834-35 (6th Cir.
1983).
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The court focused closely on the matter of what was appropriated
rather than on the means of appropriation, in upholding the right of
publicity claim of Johnny Carson against the defendant who had used
(rather creatively, if not legitimately) the phrase "Here's Johnny" in
connection with the sale of its products (portable toilets):
It is our view that, under the existing authorities, a celebrity's legal
right of publicity is invaded whenever his identity is intentionally
appropriated for commercial purposes .... It is not fatal to appel-
lant's claim that appellee did not use his "name." Indeed, there
would have been no violation of his right of publicity even if appel-
lee had used his name, such as "J. William Carson Portable Toilet"
or the "John William Carson Portable Toilet" or the "J.W. Carson
Portable Toilet." The reason is that, though literally using appel-
lant's "name," the appellee would not have appropriated Carson's
identity as a celebrity. Here there was an appropriation of Carson's
identity without using his "name. '36
In a series of cases, the Ninth Circuit, ostensibly applying Califor-
nia law, elaborated upon the theme of appropriation of identity. In
1974, in Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,37 the court,
somewhat elliptically, held that the use, in an advertisement, of a dis-
tinctively striped racing car was designed to associate an unseen and
unnamed, but well-known driver with a brand of cigarettes and was
therefore actionable. In that case, the court eschewed putting any la-
bel on the claim.38 Fourteen years later, in Midler v. Ford Motor Com-
pany,39 the court upheld the claim of a well-known singer arising out
of the use of a "sound-alike," employed to imitate her voice, singing a
song identified with her, for a commercial advertisement for an auto-
mobile. Building on Motschenbacher, the court held:
[W]hen a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known
and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers
have appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a tort in
California. Midler has made a showing, sufficient to defeat sum-
36. Id. at 837.
37. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
38. The court explained:
[W]e conclude that the California appellate courts would ... afford legal protec-
tion to an individual's proprietary interest in his own identity. We need not de-
cide whether they would do so under the rubric of "privacy," "property," or
"publicity"; we only determine that they would recognize such an interest and
protect it.
Id. at 825-26 (footnotes omitted).
39. 849 F2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), appeal after remand sub nom. Midler v. Young &
Rubicam, Inc., 944 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1991) (mem.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992).
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mary judgment, that the defendants here for their own profit in sell-
ing their product did appropriate part of her identity40
As in Motschenbacher, although the court focused on the defend-
ant's deliberate attempt to appropriate the plaintiff's identity in order
to sell a product, it did not categorize the claim. However, a few years
later, in two opinions, the Ninth Circuit set forth a common-law right
of publicity predicated on the appropriation of "identity." In a similar
"sound-alike" case, Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,n1 the Ninth Circuit
strongly reaffirmed Midler and made clear that in so doing it was artic-
ulating a common-law right of publicity.42 The Ninth Circuit elabo-
rated on this theme more expansively in White v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc.:43
It is not important how the defendant has appropriated the
plaintiffs identity, but whether the defendant has done so. Mot-
schenbacher, Midler, and Carson teach the impossibility of treating
the right of publicity as guarding only against a laundry list of spe-
cific means of appropriating identity. A rule which says that the
right of publicity can be infringed only through the use of nine dif-
ferent methods of appropriating identity merely challenges the
clever advertising strategist to come up with the tenth.
Indeed, if we treated the means of appropriation as dispositive
in our analysis of the right of publicity, we would not only weaken
the right but effectively eviscerate it. The right would fail to protect
those plaintiffs most in need of its protection. Advertisers use ce-
lebrities to promote their products. The more popular the celebrity,
the greater the number of people who recognize her, and the
greater the visibility for the product. The identities of the most pop-
ular celebrities are not only the most attractive for advertisers, but
also the easiest to evoke without resorting to obvious means such as
name, likeness, or voice.44
Although the question has not been resolved without dissent,
4 5
the impact of these decisions and the essential theoretical underpin-
40. Id. at 463. After trial, the jury returned a verdict for Midler, awarding her
$400,000; judgment on the verdict was upheld on appeal. Midler v. Young & Rubicam Inc.,
944 F.2d at 909 (tbl.), 1991 WL 185170 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 1991).
41. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
42. The court stated:
The Midler tort is a species of violation of the "right of publicity," the right of a
person whose identity has commercial value-most often a celebrity-to control
the commercial use of that identity.... We recognized in Midler that when voice
is a sufficient indicia of a celebrity's identity, the right of publicity protects against
its imitation for commercial purposes without the celebrity's consent.
I. at 1098.
43. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
44. Id. at 1399.
45. For example, see Judge Alarcon's dissent in Midler.
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ning for the right of publicity is that when the right is recognized as
the basis for a cause of action independent from the right of privacy, it
embraces appropriation of identity irrespective of the means used.
Thus, Section 46 of the new Restatement of the Law of Unfair Compe-
tition46 expressly deals with appropriation of "the commercial value of
a person's identity by using without consent the person's name, like-
ness, or other indicia of identity," and comment d to that section
clearly rejects limiting actionable appropriation to "name," "likeness,"
or any other predefined attributes:
In most cases an appropriation of identity is accomplished through
the use of a person's name or likeness .... In the absence of a
narrower statutory definition, a number of cases have held that un-
authorized use of other indicia of a person's identity can infringe the
right of publicity... if they are so closely and uniquely associated
with the identity of a particular individual that their use enables the
defendant to appropriate the commercial value of the person's
identity.47
Of course, whatever the identifiers used, for the use to be an ac-
tionable appropriation, they must unequivocally identify the plaintiff;
they must, as noted above, be "so closely and uniquely" identified
with the person "that their use enables the defendant to appropriate
the commercial value of the person's identity."4 Thus, there was no
The interest of the California Legislature as expressed in California Civil Code
section 3344 appears to preclude the result reached by the majority. The original
section 3344 protected only name or likeness. In 1984, ten years after our deci-
sion in Motschenbacher... the California Legislature amended the statute. Cali-
fornia law now makes the use of someone's voice or signature, as well as name or
likeness, actionable. Cal. Civ. Code sec. 2233(a). Thus, California, after our deci-
sion in Motschenbacher specifically contemplated protection for interests other
than name or likeness, but did not include a cause of action for appropriation of
another person's identity.... The clear implication from the fact that the Califor-
nia Legislature chose to add only voice and signature to the previously protected
interests is that it wished to limit the cause of action to enumerated attributes.
Id. at 1402-03 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). See also Judge Kozinski's opin-
ion dissenting from rejection of the suggestion for rehearing en banc in White:
[The panel majority is] replacing the existing balance between the interests of the
celebrity and those of the public by a different balance, one substantially more
favorable to the celebrity. Instead of having an exclusive right in her name, like-
ness, signature or voice, every famous person now has an exclusive right to any-
thing that reminds the viewer of her.
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
46. REsTATEmENT (Tamn) OF =H LAW OF UNFAIR COMpnrroN § 46 (1995).
47. Id. cmt. d.
48. Ld. Comment d continues:
Whether the plaintiff is identified by the defendant's use is a question of fact.
Relevant evidence includes the nature and extent of the identifying characteristics
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question in Carson, Motschenbacher, Midler, or Waits that the defend-
ant was blatantly attempting not merely to "remind" recipients of the
communication of the celebrity or vaguely to conjure up his or her
image; the point of the activity was expressly to associate the individ-
ual's identity with the defendant's product as clearly as if a "name" or
"likeness" had been used.
White, however, was not nearly that clear. The White opinion
provoked strong dissents, 49 with the dissenters objecting ostensibly to
the recognition of a common-law right involving identifiers not limited
to those enumerated in the California statute. Neither the Midler nor
the Waits opinions, which likewise were grounded on the recognition
of such nonenumerated identifiers, engendered the kind of outcry that
accompanied White. I would suggest that, despite the ostensible con-
cern with "expansion" of the right of publicity, the real concern arises
not from problems with the rationale underlying an independent right
of publicity, but from the more ambiguous factual situation in White.
Within the context of an independent right of publicity grounded on
"identity," there still remains the question of whether the majority
there appropriately applied the criteria for the right of publicity.
In White the defendants had created a series of print advertise-
ments for Samsung's electronic products; each advertisement, set in
the twenty-first century, "depicted a current item from popular cul-
ture" in the form it might then take, along with a Samsung product,
and conveyed the message that, however the culture might change,
the product would still be in use. The advertisement at issue was for a
VCR juxtaposed against
a robot, dressed in a wig, gown, and jewelry which [were] con-
sciously selected to resemble [Vanna] White's hair and dress. The
robot was posed next to a game board which is instantly recogniza-
ble as the Wheel of Fortune game show set, in a stance for which
White is famous. The caption of the ad read: "Longest-running
game show. 2012 A.D." Defendants referred to the ad as the
"Vanna White" ad.50
In this context, it is arguable that the defendants did not so much
appropriate Vanna White's identity as they used it to evoke the sub-
ject (i.e., the Wheel of Fortune game show) with which she has been
used by the defendant, the defendant's intent, the fame of the plaintiff, evidence
of actual identification made by third persons, and surveys or other evidence indi-
cating the perceptions of the audience.
49. See supra note 45.
50. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
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associated. Indeed, it is to the show itself that the majority refers in its
determination that there was an appropriation of White's identity.51
Whatever the specific identifiers used, it is not clear that it was White
herself who was being associated with the product rather than some-
thing that White does and that might just also be done by someone
else. White has a proprietary interest in herself; she does not have a
proprietary interest in turning a wheel. Arguably, it is not Vanna
White, but a role she has come to epitomize, that was the subject of
the advertisement. One may well claim that for purposes of Wheel of
Fortune or a similar game show, Vanna White has become "generic,"
her name and general "dressed-up" appearance a shorthand way of
referring to a type, so that any other woman, similarly dressed and
performing a similar act, even if otherwise totally unlike White, might
be described as being another "Vanna." Arguably, at least, in the con-
text of Wheel of Fortune, White herself is stereotypical and her own
identity as such is not the relevant factor. The defendants used the
White stereotype, but not necessarily to evoke her. The "generic" de-
fense was rejected by the White majority, but without serious analysis
of its specific application to the facts there.52
In short, at some point some aspect of a celebrity may transcend
his or her own persona and become evocative of a more general, if not
51. Id. at 1399:
Viewed separately, the individual aspects of the advertisement in the present case
say little. Viewed together, they leave little doubt about the celebrity the ad is
meant to depict. The female-shaped robot is wearing a long gown, blond wig, and
large jewelry. Vanna White dresses exactly like this at times, but so do many
other women. The robot is in the process of turning a block letter on a game-
board. Vanna White dresses like this while turning letters on a game-board but
perhaps similarly attired Scrabble-playing women do this as well. The robot is
standing on what looks to be the Wheel of Fortune game show set. Vanna White
dresses like this, turns letters, and does this on the Wheel of Fortune game show.
She is the only one. Indeed, defendants themselves referred to their ad as the
"Vanna White" ad. We are not surprised.
52. Id. at 1401 n.3:
This case concerns only the market which exists in our society for the exploitation
of celebrity to sell products, and an attempt to take a free ride on a celebrity's
celebrity value. Commercial advertising which relies on celebrity fame is differ-
ent from other forms of expressive activity in two crucial ways.
First, for celebrity exploitation advertising to be effective, the advertisement
must evoke the celebrity's identity. The more effective the evocation, the better
the advertisement. If, as Samsung claims, its ad was based on a "generic" game-
show hostess and not on Vanna White, the ad would not have violated anyone's
right of publicity, but it would also not have been as humorous or as effective.
Second, even if some forms of expressive activity, such as parody, do rely on
identity evocation, the first amendment hurdle will bar most right of publicity
actions against those activities.
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generic concept. The Norwegian, Vidkun Quisling, has been long for-
gotten, but our language has absorbed the word "quisling" without
specific reference to the individual to whom it originally belonged; the
individual came to embody the concept.5 3 The inappropriateness of
the right of publicity in such a situation would seem to be self-evident.
Certainly, this concept of the "generic" persona served to support the
Second Circuit's denial of relief to the plaintiff in Rogers v. Gri-
maldi,5 4 in which the actress-dancer Ginger Rogers attempted unsuc-
cessfully to prevent the use of the title "Ginger and Fred" for a motion
picture whose plot involved two Italian dancers known for their imita-
tion of Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire.
That there is a basis for arguing that the White majority did not
properly apply the standards applicable to the right of publicity of
course is certainly not an indictment of those standards. The problem,
such as it is, that emerges from this case is not in an "expansive" right
of publicity that recognizes identifiers beyond the formulaic "name or
likeness. '5 5 To the extent that the dissenters have legitimate cause for
viewing with alarm the result in White-to the extent that the case
may be said to grant to "every famous person.., an exclusive right to
anything that reminds the viewer of her"56-the issue really is that of
distinguishing appropriation of associative value from mere evocation.
That dissent here may also be a broader attempt to question the pro-
priety of the right of publicity itself is a matter 7 quite apart from the
question of the proper attributes of identity. In any event, whatever
the merits of the White opinion, in refusing to limit the right of public-
ity to the privacy formula the majority is consistent with both prior
judicial thinking and scholarly commentary as to the nature of the
right of publicity.
53. Pace Captain Boycott. Is the phrase "Shirley Temple," used to denote a nonalco-
holic bar drink, today an appropriation of the persona of the actress, or did her name
simply become, by virtue of the roles she played, an efficient way to describe certain
characteristics?
54. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
55. Would the situation really have been different had the ad used words such as "a
21st century incarnation of Vanna turning the Wheel?" There is, of course, the problem of
statutory interpretation: does California's statutory enumeration of identifiers preclude a
broader, common-law recognition? Cf. Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474
N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984) (contrary resolution under New York law).
56. See supra note 45.
57. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 70-88.
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(2) First Amendment Concerns
By its nature, the right of publicity implicates speech: whatever
else it may be, the right of publicity involves a communicative tort. Of
course, such a characterization merely starts-and does not resolve-
a First Amendment inquiry. Nor is that inquiry resolved simply by
reference to the Supreme Court's enunciation of the proposition that
the First Amendment does not preclude a right of publicity claim.58
Indeed, the Supreme Court has not dealt directly with a paradigmatic
right of publicity case.59
Certainly, when a celebrity is the subject of books, plays, or mag-
azine or newspaper articles, the author evokes the celebrity's persona
for personal gain. Nevertheless, such "entertainment" or "news-
worthy" uses are beyond the reach of the right of publicity. 60 "[T]he
right of publicity has not been held to outweigh the value of free ex-
pression" 61 and First Amendment policy considerations clearly immu-
nize these uses notwithstanding their invasion of the personality
interest.62
The broad "newsworthiness" shelter that insulates many uses of
an individual's identity from right of privacy claims63 is no less appli-
cable to the right of publicity64 and has been the means by which the
58. Zacehini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
59. Zacchini was concerned with the broadcast of the plaintiff's "entire act." The
court characterized the claim in that context as "what may be the strongest case for a 'right
of publicity' involving, not the appropriation of an entertainer's reputation to enhance the
attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation of the very activity by which
the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first place." Id. at 576.
60. See e.g., Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1989); cf
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 569.
61. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 461-62 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, J.,
concurring).
62. "Any other conclusion would allow reports and commentaries on the thoughts
and conduct of public and prominent persons to be subject to censorship under the guise of
preventing the dissipation of the publicity value of a person's identity." Id.
As the Ninth Circuit observed, "The California Supreme Court has subjected the
'right of publicity' under California law to a narrowing interpretation which accords with
First Amendment values." Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 638 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983); see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
63. See HALPERN, PRIVACY, PuBLicrrY, supra note 2, at 407-24.
64. Se4 e.g., Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982).
As a general rule, if the defendants' works are designed primarily to promote the
dissemination of thoughts, ideas or information through news or fictionalization,
the right of publicity gives way to protected expression .... If, however, the
defendants' use of the celebrity's name or likeness is largely for commercial pur-
poses, such as the sale of merchandise, the right of publicity prevails.
523 F. Supp. at 492.
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courts have consistently defined the ambit of constitutionally pro-
tected dissemination of ideas.65 As the Restatement of the Law of Un-
fair Competition makes clear, the right of publicity does not ordinarily
extend to "the use of a person's identity in news reporting, commen-
tary, entertainment, or in works of fiction or nonfiction or in advertis-
ing that is incidental to such uses."'66 The newsworthy, entertainment,
critical, satirical, or parodic uses are sheltered precisely because they
go beyond the simple act of appropriation. 67
The right of publicity does not reach beyond the interest it is
designed to protect, i.e., the associative value, the hard economic com-
mercial value of an individual's identity, and thus is limited to com-
mercial exploitative uses. It is this exploitative appropriation of a
property interest, and not simply a formulaic approach to commercial
speech, that precludes First Amendment protection for the appropria-
tor. As a result, for the most part, First Amendment policy considera-
tions have little impact on the avowedly commercial appropriation of
identity, the classic right of publicity case.
This is not to suggest that there are not legitimate First Amend-
ment concerns, but only that such concerns are not resolved one way
or the other by one's views of the ambit of protection for commercial
speech. Thus, at the outer edges of the right of publicity, there may be
challenging questions of policy. For example, imitation and imperson-
ation create difficult issues; interests must be balanced in order to pro-
tect the personality interest from appropriation while preserving the
equally deserving areas of parody, 68 satire, and self-conscious imper-
sonation. Compare the professional impersonator who evokes the
subject's persona, more to call attention to the impersonator's own
talents than to use the celebrity's associative value, and the patently
exploitative impersonation of a well-known person by an anonymous
65. See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th
Cir. 1992); Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. at 485.
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995); see
supra note 27.
67. Cf. Groucho Marx Productions, 523 F. Supp. at 492-93 (citations omitted):
By analogy to copyright law and the fair use doctrine, parody, burlesque, satire
and critical review might be immune from the right of publicity because of their
contribution as entertainment and as a form of literary criticism .... In contrast
to an imitator, who usurps a work for commercial gain without contributing sub-
stantially to the work, a commentator, parodist or satirist makes use of another's
attributes in order to create a larger presentation.
68. Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994) (copyright); Cliffs
Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989)
(trademark).
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impersonator primarily to associate the celebrity, rather than the im-
personator, with a product in order to capitalize on that association.
We must fashion coherent policy to distinguish these uses.69
The Revisionists: Of Red Herrings and Straw Men
Forty years of judicial and legislative effort have produced a co-
herently defined and rather clearly enumerated independent right of
publicity protecting the economic associative value of identity. With
limited (if not idiosyncratic) dissent,7 0 the development was fostered
and encouraged by legal scholarship.71 Debate over policy limitations
and boundaries was thoughtful and productive72 and had largely come
to an end with the maturation of the right of publicity.
It has recently been suggested that "the fundamental case for a
right of publicity seems to be undergoing a critical reappraisal in the
United States. '73 It would perhaps be more accurate to say that a
very few voices have been raised questioning the legitimacy of the
right. As one of the more thoughtful of such voices candidly puts it:
"My purpose is to rain hard on this parade [of support for the right of
publicity, and] ... to reopen the question of whether the right of pub-
licity should exist at ali."74
However, the difficulty with this attempt to reopen that which has
been rather clearly settled is that the current academic75 attempt to
69. Cf Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (holding that
defendant's performance of an entire "Big El" show violated the estate's rights); Apple
Corps Ltd. v. Leber, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1015 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986) ("Beatlemania"
show, look-alikes performing Beatles songs, held to violate the Beatles' right of publicity):
As a general proposition, a theatrical, orchestral, or cinematic performance is a
form of expression, protected as free speech. On the other hand, entertainment
that merely imitates, does not have a creative component of its own and is not
protected by the First Amendment.
Id. at 1016. See Halpern, Associative Value, supra note 2, at 1252-54.
70. See Lange, supra note 20.
71. See, eg., sources cited supra notes 2, 3, and 12.
72. Cf. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert denied,
449 U.S. 953 (1980); Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cerL
denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
73. Stephen R. Barnett, At a Crossroads: The Right of Publicity in the United States
(unpublished manuscript) (presented at the Right of Publicity Program at the 1994 Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association) (on file with author).
74. Madow, supra note 10, at 134.
75. Although what has been written has largely been by academics, there has been
some judicial joinder in the hyperbolic assault:
Saddam Hussein wants to keep advertisers from using his picture in unflattering
contexts. Clint Eastwood doesn't want tabloids to write about him. Rudolf Va-
lentino's heirs want to control his film biography. The Girl Scouts don't want
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destroy the right ultimately rests at best on marginal issues not seri-
ously implicated by the right of publicity as it has been developed and
at worst on an ad hoc and self-referential "deconstruction" of judicial
thinking. Indeed, much of the criticism has its roots in a more general
Critical Legal Studies attack on intellectual property (if not all "prop-
erty") and the legal process,76 as well as in an earlier work that viewed
"the growth of intellectual property [as] uncontrolled to the point of
recklessness," 77 and characterized trial judges struggling with these is-
sues as "notoriously apt to be foolish or bourgeois or both or
worse." 78 However, the attacks whether serious or spurious, rest on
conjectural extrapolation and the conjuring up of hypothetical exten-
sions of the right of publicity far removed from reality.
At bottom lies unhappiness with the reality of celebrity value, the
"commodification" of personality.79 For many, a certain moral repug-
nance attaches to the commercialization of fame. As a purely per-
sonal matter, I suppose I would be happier intellectually in a society
their image soiled by association with certain activities. George Lucas wants to
keep Strategic Defense Initiative fans from calling it "Star Wars." Pepsico
doesn't want singers to use the word "Pepsi" in their songs. Guy Lombardo
wants an exclusive property right to ads that show big bands playing on New
Year's Eve. Uri Geller thinks he should be paid for ads showing psychics bending
metal through telekinesis. Paul Prudhomme, that household name, thinks the
same about ads featuring corpulent bearded chefs. And scads of copyright hold-
ers see purple when their creations are made fun of. Something very dangerous is
going on here.
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1512-13 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from rejection of the suggestion for rehearing en banc) (footnotes omitted). See
supra note 45.
76. See JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE
LAw (1991); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual
Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 Thx. L. REv. 1853 (1991).
77. Lange, supra note 20, at 147.
78. Id. at 164.
79. See, e.g., George M. Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of Celebrity: Persons as Prop-
erty, 51 LA. L. REv. 443 (1991):
[Tihe ideology of the market encourages the belief that aspects of ourselves once
considered entirely personal and out of commerce on grounds which law profes-
sors like to call "policy" may become objects of exchange. Once the legal system
has recognized that a value previously out of commerce has become property,
academic commentators often castigate the old jurisprudence as "hidebound,"
"impractical." These commentators fail to recognize the influence of the market
in molding their own ideas. They praise the new jurisprudence as "intuitive,"
"down-to-earth," unconstrained by "morality," without recognizing that the
faculty of "common sense" which renders these holdings valid is nothing more
than the dominant ideology of the day. In the process of shaping our notions of
"common sense" the market also modifies our concept of morality.
Id. at 463-64 (footnote omitted); see also Madow, supra note 10, at 148-78.
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that did not endow fame with an economic value apart from the activ-
ity that creates the notoriety. But my personal aversion to market
reality does not change that reality nor should it serve as a basis for
devaluing a legal construct that recognizes that reality.
From that personal predilection there generally follows a gloss on
"creativity" that misconceives the role of the creative process in the
attribution of associative value. That is, it is argued that the celebrity
rarely is the exclusive creator of that which has produced the econom-
ically exploitable fame-that "creativity" is a cumulative process in
which the individual constantly adopts and adapts the work of prede-
cessors; that fame is frequently as much the product of fortuitous cir-
cumstance as of creative merit; and that the public itself is a partner in
creating fame and therefore the "public domain" should share in that
fame by precluding the grant of exclusive rights to its exploitation.80
The argument, on its face, can be quite deceptively persuasive:
A celebrity, in short, does not make her public image... in anything
like the way a carpenter makes a chair from a block of wood. She is
not the sole and sovereign "author" of what she means for others.
Contingency cannot be entirely erased. The creative (and autono-
mous) role of the media aid the audience in the meaning-making
process cannot be excised.... [D]espite ... variations, a celebrity's
public image is always the product of a complex social, if not fully
democratic, process in which the "labor" (time, money, effort) of
the celebrity herself (and of the celebrity industry, too) is but one
ingredient, and not always the main one.... [A] celebrity... can-
not say of her public image what the carpenter can say of his chair:
"I made it." And because she cannot say this of her public image,
she cannot lay a convincing moral claim to the exclusive ownership
or control of the economic values that attach to it.81
Despite its appeal and eloquence, however, this argument is
largely irrelevant. The right of publicity in recognizing exclusive
rights to "fame" is not predicated on a moral judgment of transcen-
dent "entitlement." At the risk of being accused of an excess of "com-
mon sense" and "reality," this Essay must restate the obvious:
recognition of the legal right is predicated on a societal reaction to the
phenomenon of celebrity.82 That there is economic value associated
with fame is undeniable. The question of who should benefit from
that value does not amount to choosing between the "public domain"
in general and a perhaps undeserving celebrity fortuitously pocketing
public largesse. The focus on the "public" misconceives both the in-
80. Madow, supra note 10, at 182-96.
81. IL at 195-96.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 17-23.
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terest that the right of publicity protects and-except in the most mar-
ginal of circumstances-the real nature of the act of appropriation.
There is less to this issue than meets the eye. The question is not
whether the celebrity "deserves" the benefits of celebrity.83 The real
question to ask one who connects the persona of another with a com-
mercial undertaking is "why are you doing it?"84 In short, whether or
not there is some moral or public benefit from commercial exploita-
tion of celebrity, we are not asked to choose between the rights of the
public at large and a fortuitously placed individual; the choice is be-
tween the individual to whom that associative value attaches and a
stranger to the process who would make money out of it. Even if, at
its lowest level, the choice is that between two sets of scavengers trad-
ing on the ephemera of fame,85 logic and fairness would seem to com-
pel favoring the scavenger who has at least some colorable connection
to the phenomenon. If there is any public interest at all involved in
the commercialization of fame, the interest lies in avoiding unfairness
within the universe of the competing commercial interests.
On a different, and more global level, the right of publicity is at-
tacked as a device that "redistributes wealth upwards"86 and, more
ominously, centralizes "control over the production and circulation of
meaning in our society," to the detriment of "subordinate and
marginalized groups. '87 These are strong words, words designed to
make one choose between the good and the bad, the correct and the
incorrect. But they are only words. Apart from conjectural hypothet-
icals, no demonstration is really offered as to how in practice recogni-
tion of the right has served-or seriously threatens-either to
perpetuate some dominant "hegemony" or to oppress, suppress or re-
press countercultural ideas. This is not to suggest that signs, a semi-
otic analysis of culture and behavior, are not terribly important or that
in market recognition of the associative value of fame there is not a
form of semiotic transformation. However, that analysis justifies
neither the cavalier dismissal of the scholarly and judicial foundations
for the right of publicity nor the conclusion that, with respect to the
83. "The so-called right of publicity means in essence that the reaction of the public to
name and likeness, which may be fortuitous or which may be managed or planned, endows
the name and likeness of the person involved with commercially exploitable opportuni-
ties." Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979), quoted with approval in
McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 918 (3d Cir. 1994).
84. Cf supra note 1.
85. Cf. Halpern, Associative Value, supra note 2, at 1236.
86. Madow, supra note 10. at 137 (emphasis in original).
87. Id. at 142 (emphasis in original).
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viability of the right, "[the] case has yet to be made. 88 On the con-
trary, the paucity of hard analysis demonstrating true societal detri-
ment and the reliance on conjectural extrapolation rather than on
examination of the right's core paradigm leaves the burden still on
those who would undo the work of the past forty years.
Conclusion
To say that the right of publicity has reached a point of maturity is
not to say that the work of definition and limitation is done. The com-
plex questions, such as those raised by White v. Samsung,89 and the
unsettled boundary at the interface of evocation and appropriation,90
require continuing efforts to articulate principled bases for both the
limitations and the expansion of the right. There is every reason to
believe that such efforts are ongoing.91 Indeed, while one may, as I
do, seriously question the premises underlying the attack on the exist-
ence of the right of publicity, that attack may well serve to help in the
process of refinement. That the attempt at revision rests ultimately on
rather ephemeral footing does not obviate the need for continuing
search for extensible principle.
Of course, the viability and justification for the right of publicity
in the face of "the question of whether the right of publicity should
exist at all" 92 does not rest simply on the negative foundation of allo-
cation of burden of proof. The Haelan opinion's recognition of a pro-
prietary interest in personality and the analytic work done over four
decades adumbrate a right that is predicated on significant societal
interests and concerns. It is not happenstance that the right of public-
ity has come to be articulated in the Restatement of the Law of Unfair
Competition. There is, at bottom, recognition of the fact that there is
something wrong, a manifest "unfairness," when one person seeks to
trade on the personality of another.93 The right of publicity is the
means to address and ameliorate that wrong.
88. Id. at 135.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
91. See e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. The First Amend-
ment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 INDIAA LJ. 47 (1994) (seeking to ame-
liorate possible first amendment concerns by means of "liability rules").
92. Madow, supra note 10, at 134.
93. See eg., Frazer, supra note 7; Kwall, supra note 7; Shipley, supra note 3.
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